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Article 
The Extraterritoriality Formalisms 
AARON D. SIMOWITZ 
The extraterritorial application of U.S. law was a settled issue for a long time. For 
about sixty years, U.S. law would apply abroad if conduct occurred or effects were felt 
within U.S. borders. This potentially broad sweep of U.S. law was limited in several 
ways—most importantly by the doctrine of “reasonableness” grounded in international 
law and explicated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States.  
This approach had its detractors. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court joined the ranks 
of the critics in dramatic fashion. The Court cast aside the previous sixty years of 
jurisprudence—dismissing it as uninhibited “judicial lawmaking”—and created a new 
test. This new approach proceeded in two parts. A court should ask whether the 
“presumption against extraterritoriality”—a sometimes cited, but oft ignored concept—
was rebutted by a “clear indication” in the text or “context” of the statute. If not, a court 
should then inquire whether the particular case presents a “domestic application” of the 
statute. But merely “some domestic activity” would not constitute a domestic application 
of the statute. Rather, the court must define the “objects of the statute’s solicitude” and 
then determine whether that “focus” is within U.S. borders. 
The Court presented this revolution as more predictable, less complex, and 
more deferential to the legislature. In reality, the Court traded the venerable 
uncertainties of the conduct-and-effects test for the new, poorly understood, and 
unanticipated uncertainties of the “Morrison two-step.” Many commentators have 
attempted to make sense of Morrison’s first step—the reinvigorated presumption 
against extraterritoriality. But relatively few have examined Morrison’s second 
step—the question of what it means for a statute to apply domestically in the context 
of a transnational dispute. In fact, this second question—which the Morrison 
opinion treats practically as a throw-away line—has caused far more divergence 
and confusion among the lower courts. It has become a distorted reflection of the 
extraterritoriality inquiry: the same consequences, but with irrelevant facts or 
formalisms looming large in the picture. This article attempts to lay out both the 






I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND DOMESTIC APPLICATION .......... 382
A. THE OLD REGIME – THE CONDUCT AND EFFECTS TEST ................. 382
B. THE NEW OLD EXTRATERRITORIALITY – THE PRESUMPTION ......... 384
C. EXTRATERRITORIALITY’S DISTORTED REFLECTION – THE FOCUS  
 TEST ........................................................................................... 388
II. DOMESTIC APPLICATION DISHARMONY .................................... 389
A. THE DOMESTIC OFF-EXCHANGE TRANSACTION ............................ 389
B. THE DOMESTIC RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE ................................ 391
C. THE DOMESTIC FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ................................ 392
D. THE DOMESTIC RIGHT TO PRIVACY .............................................. 394
III. THE FOCUS FORMALISMS ............................................................. 396
A. THE ATOMIZED FOCUS ................................................................ 397
B. THE SINGLE FOCUS ...................................................................... 397
C. THE SUFFICIENT FOCUS ............................................................... 399
D. THE LOCALIZABLE FOCUS............................................................ 402
IV. A NEW FOCUS ................................................................................. 404
A. APPLY PRESCRIPTIVE COMITY ...................................................... 405
B. RECOGNIZE MULTIPLE FOCUSES ................................................... 409










The Extraterritoriality Formalisms 
AARON D. SIMOWITZ * 
INTRODUCTION 
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court 
discarded sixty years of jurisprudence governing whether U.S. law would 
apply beyond U.S. borders.1 The Court did so in the name of predictability 
and consistency. The actual results have largely been confusion and 
divergence. However, the source of the greatest discord has largely been 
overlooked, both by the Court and by commentators. 
The Morrison Court spent the vast majority of its opinion on a single 
project: reinvigorating the “presumption against extraterritoriality.”2 For 
sixty years before Morrison, U.S. laws had applied abroad when either 
conduct occurred or effects were felt in the United States. Potential 
overreach was policed by several doctrines, most notably the application of 
“reasonableness,” rooted in international law and delineated in the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.3  
The Morrison Court attacked this approach, declaring it to be 
uninhibited “judicial lawmaking,”4 with results “complex in formulation and 
unpredictable in application.”5 The Court replaced this structure with the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, which can be rebutted only when the 
text or “context” of the statute contain a “clear indication” of extraterritorial 
application.6 The presumption did not prove to be simple or predictable. In 
                                                                                                                     
* Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law; Affiliated Scholar, The Classical 
Liberal Institute at New York University School of Law. I owe great thanks to Linda Silberman, Pamela 
Bookman, Bill Dodge, Symeon Symeonides, Jim Nafziger, Jeff Dobbins, Andrew Gilden, Norman 
Williams, Karen Sandrik, Peter Molk, Warren Binford, Frank Gevurtz, Maggie Gardner and the 
participants in the Northern California International Law Scholars Conference and in the Stanford Civil 
Procedure Workshop. I am also indebted to my wife for her insights on the complexities of the cross-
border swaps market. 
1 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“This disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality did not 
originate with the Court of Appeals panel in this case. It has been repeated over many decades by various 
courts of appeals in determining the application of the Exchange Act, and § 10(b) in particular, to 
fraudulent schemes that involve conduct and effects abroad.”). 
2 See id. at 255 (describing the presumption against extraterritoriality as “long and often recited in 
our opinions”). 
3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 (1986) 
(describing the conduct-and-effects test). 
4 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261 (“The concurrence urges us to cast aside our inhibitions and join in the 
judicial lawmaking.”). 
5 Id. at 248. 
6 See id. at 265. 
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successive cases, the Court either failed to lay out a clear, consensus 
approach to the analysis7 or made significant alterations to it.8 
Even so, the main source of confusion has been left largely unaddressed. 
Morrison set out a two-part test.9 The Court held that no clear indication 
existed to rebut the presumption, and so inquired whether the present case 
constituted a “domestic application” of the statute.10 The Morrison Court 
expressly acknowledged the necessity of this inquiry, noting that when the 
“presumption here (as often) is not self-evidently dispositive . . . its 
application requires further analysis.”11 However, the Court cautioned that 
“it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all 
contact with the territory of the United States,” and that “the presumption 
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it 
retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the 
case.”12 
Rejecting this “timid sentinel,”13 the Court held that lower courts must 
first determine “the objects of the statute’s solicitude,”14 and then find 
whether that “focus of congressional concern” is “domestic.”15 The new 
test—although the Court did nothing to acknowledge its novelty—came to 
be known as “the focus test.”16 The Court presented the focus test as simple. 
Perhaps it seemed so in context of the Morrison case itself. The Morrison 
case was a classic “f-cubed” case—an action for securities fraud under the 
                                                                                                                     
7 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (“And even where the 
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”). 
8 See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016) (“We agree with the 
Second Circuit that Congress’s incorporation of these (and other) extraterritorial predicates into RICO 
gives a clear, affirmative indication that § 1962 applies to foreign racketeering activity—but only to the 
extent that the predicates alleged in a particular case themselves apply extraterritorially.”). 
9 See id. at 2101 (“Morrison and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for analyzing 
extraterritoriality issues.”). 
10 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (“Petitioners argue that the conclusion that § 10(b) does not apply 
extraterritorially does not resolve this case. They contend that they seek no more than domestic 
application anyway, since Florida is where HomeSide and its senior executives engaged in the deceptive 
conduct of manipulating HomeSide’s financial models . . . .”). 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 267. 
15 Id. at 266 (“In Aramco, for example, the Title VII plaintiff had been hired in Houston, and was 
an American citizen. The Court concluded, however, that neither that territorial event nor that 
relationship was the ‘focus’ of congressional concern, but rather domestic employment.” (quoting EEOC 
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991))). 
16 See William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110 AM. J. 
INT’L L. UNBOUND 45, 45–46 (2016) (detailing and analyzing the two-step test presented in RJR Nabisco, 
where the second step of the test involves looking into the statute’s focus); Franklin A. Gevurtz, 
Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 342 (2014) (“[I]f the focus of the statute 
determines extraterritoriality, what is the test for determining the focus of the statute?”). 
 
 2019] THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY FORMALISMS 379 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”) that sought redress for a foreign 
plaintiff against a foreign defendant, based on public trading on a foreign 
exchange.17 The focus test has proved to be truly “complex in formulation 
and unpredictable in application”18 in other areas of law—and even in 
securities law, the heartland of the Morrison opinion. 
The focus test introduces two types of uncertainty. First, the focus test 
creates statutory uncertainty. The Morrison test requires courts to identify 
the statute’s focus—“the objects of the statute’s solicitude.”19 Perhaps this 
was a simple question in the context of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
The Court seemed to have little trouble concluding that the focus of the Act 
was the exchange itself.20 But this inquiry has become far more complicated 
as the Court has expanded the Morrison test to other statutes—apparently, 
to every other statute.21 For example, appellate courts split over the 
Congress’s regulatory focus in the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”), unable to decide whether this multifaceted 
statute “focused” on corrupt enterprises or patterns of criminal conduct—as 
the United States itself suggested—both.22 In the RJR Nabisco v. European 
Community case, the Court declined to answer the question, but rather 
emphasized the additional complication that each statutory subsection must 
have its own individual focus.23 
The second source of uncertainty is descriptive. Even once a court has 
identified “the objects of a statute’s solicitude”—for example, the securities 
transaction in Morrison—it may be quite difficult to say whether a particular 
object is inside or outside the United States.24 Again, the Morrison Court did 
not seem to foresee this complication. 
The Morrison case concerned securities traded on a public exchange. It 
                                                                                                                     
17 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 283 n.11.  
18 Id. at 248. 
19 Id. at 267.  
20 See id. (“The primacy of the domestic exchange is suggested by the very prologue of the 
Exchange Act . . . .”). 
21 See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (“Absent clearly 
expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic 
application . . . . We therefore apply the presumption across the board . . . .”). 
22 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (No. 15-138), 2015 WL 9268185, at *9 (“Contrary to petitioners' 
claim, RICO contains no domestic-enterprise requirement. RICO’s ‘focus’ is on the ‘pattern’ as well as 
the enterprise. Accordingly, if a pattern of domestic racketeering activity occurs, RICO may be violated 
whether the enterprise is foreign or domestic.” (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266)). 
23 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106 (“The same logic requires that we separately apply the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to RICO's cause of action despite our conclusion that the 
presumption has been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibitions.”). 
24 See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 326 (2015) 
(“Territoriality, after all, depends on the ability to define the relevant ‘here’ and ‘there,’ and it presumes 
that the ‘here’ and ‘there’ have normative significance. The ease and speed with which data travels across 
borders . . . test[s] these foundational premises.”). 
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is not difficult for a U.S. court to conclude that the New York Stock 
Exchange is “domestic” and that the London Exchange is not. However, the 
Court devoted a half-sentence to the entire subject to so-called off-exchange 
transactions—securities transactions that do not take place on a public 
exchange. From 2008 to 2014, the percentage of all U.S. stock traded 
conducted off-exchange increased from sixteen to about forty percent.25 The 
actual percentage of off-exchange transactions is likely much higher once 
all non-equity securities transactions are included. In this much larger 
category of securities transactions, the Court caused complete confusion. 
Some have tied the application of U.S. securities law to empty territorial 
proxies—such as the place of closing, the applicable law, or the identity of 
the parties.26 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—
the federal appellate court most responsible for securities cases—rejected 
these approaches and chose to tie U.S. regulation to “the place where 
irrevocable liability is incurred.”27 This test quickly proved both 
unpredictable and, in that court’s own admission, over-inclusive.28 
Some cases have combined both statutory and descriptive uncertainty. 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that the Stored Communication Act’s regulatory focus was “the right to 
privacy,” rejecting the litigants’ arguments that the focus was either the 
place of the production of the data, or the server with which the data was 
                                                                                                                     
25 John McCrank, Dark Markets May Be More Harmful than High-Frequency Trading, REUTERS 
(Apr. 6, 2014, 8:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dark-markets-analysis/dark-markets-may-
be-more-harmful-than-high-frequency-trading-idUSBREA3508V20140406. 
26 See, e.g., SEC v. Compania Internacional Financiera S.A., No. 11 CIV 4904 DLC, 2011 WL 
3251813, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011) (applying Morrison and concluding that extraterritorial 
application was warranted where foreign parties were conducting off-exchange trading of contracts for 
difference on stock of an exchange-traded company because the underlying securities were associated 
with a national exchange). 
27  Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012). 
28 The U.S. Supreme Court’s quest for uncertainty has confounded not only courts, but also 
regulators. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is charged with promulgating rules 
to govern the U.S. regulation of swap contracts. These are the very “swaps” that Warren Buffett described 
as the “financial weapons of mass destruction” that turned the sub-prime mortgage crisis into a global 
financial crisis. Lucinda Shen, Warren Buffett Just Unloaded $195 Million Worth of These 'Weapons of 
Mass Destruction,' FORTUNE (Aug. 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/08/mass-destruction-buffett-
derivatives/. The landmark Dodd-Frank financial reform statute charged the CFTC with “exclusive 
jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving swaps or contracts 
of sale of a commodity for future delivery.” 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). After Morrison, the CFTC went through 
multiple gyrations attempts to set out rule-based approaches to Dodd-Frank’s registration requirements. 
Michael L. Spafford & Daren F. Stanaway, The Extraterritorial Reach of the Commodity Exchange Act 
in the Wake of Morrison and Dodd-Frank, 37 J. ON L. INV. & RISK MGMT. PRODUCTS, July 2017, at 10 
(“Although Congress declined to expand the extraterritorial reach of the CEA in the same manner in 
which it amended the securities laws in Dodd-Frank, it did not leave the CFTC without recourse to pursue 
foreign entities.”). 
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principally associated.29 Other members of that court described this as “not 
marginally more useful than thinking of Santa Claus as a denizen of the 
North Pole,”30 and a severe restriction on “an essential investigative tool 
used thousands of times a year [in] important criminal investigations around 
the country.”31 To the relief of many, the legislature stepped in to resolve the 
issue by statute after the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.32 
This article seeks to address the statutory uncertainty created by 
Morrison.33 The lower courts have committed a variety of errors in 
attempting to wrestle with this new inquiry thrust on them by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. These errors must be identified and addressed. The lower 
courts have also so far failed to articulate a coherent or consistent approach 
to the question of what constitutes “domestic application” of U.S. law in a 
transnational dispute. This article seeks to do both, while recognizing that 
the fundamentally transnational context in which the “domestic application” 
inquiry arise. 
Unless the “focus test” is remediated or discarded, the second step of 
Morrison will be a warped and puzzling reflection of the extraterritoriality 
inquiry. If a court concludes that a statute has been applied “domestically,” 
that decision will have the exact same consequences for a dispute as the 
conclusion that the law applies extraterritorially. But the “domestic 
application” inquiry focuses on irrelevant facts and formalisms—like where 
data is localized—while ignoring the weightier and more important question 
of which sovereign is best situated to regulate the conduct at issue. 
This article proceeds in four parts. First, the article will identify the ways 
in which the development of the Morrison test led to the current discord. 
Second, the article will examine the various and disparate bodies of law in 
which the “focus test” has caused confusion and identify the particular 
mistakes and myths that are common to each body of law. Third, the Article 
identifies the unnecessary formalisms that have encrusted and distorted the 
                                                                                                                     
29 Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 217 (2d Cir. 2016). (“[W]e conclude that the relevant provisions of the SCA focus 
on protecting the privacy of the content of a user's stored electronic communications.”), vacated as moot 
sub nom. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).  
30 Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 855 F.3d 53, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“Localizing the data in Ireland is not 
marginally more useful than thinking of Santa Claus as a denizen of the North Pole. Problems arise if 
one over-thinks the problem, reifying the notional: Where in the world is a Bitcoin? Where in my DVR 
are the images and voices? Where are the snows of yesteryear?”). 
31 Id. at 63 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (“To top this off, the panel majority’s decision does not serve 
any serious, legitimate, or substantial privacy interest.”). 
32 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1187–88 (2018) (acknowledging the 
mootness of the overseas data privacy question at issue after Congress passed the Clarifying Lawful 
Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act) on March 23, 2018).  
33 Each of these uncertainties—statutory and descriptive—merit their own paper. I plan to address 
the descriptive uncertainty—where there is an off-exchange security transaction, a right to privacy, a 
pattern of criminal conduct, or a fraudulent transaction—in future work. 
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focus test. Fourth, the article lays out a new vision for how best to execute 
the Supreme Court’s exhortation to determine the “domestic application” of 
U.S. law in transnational disputes. 
I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND DOMESTIC APPLICATION 
The era of the conduct and effects test does not deserve to be 
romanticized. The conduct and effects test attracted plenty of calls for 
reform or demolition.34 However, after eighty years or so, its uncertainties 
were more or less known.35 It is possible that, after another eighty years or 
so, the Morrison version of the presumption will be regarded as an 
improvement over the old regime. The Morrison presumption certainly 
shows no signs of fading. Rather, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope 
of the presumption in successive cases, even as its formulation has shifted 
significantly with each iteration.36  
A. The Old Regime – The Conduct and Effects Test 
For several decades, the U.S. doctrine of extraterritoriality proceeded in 
a more or less straight line. U.S. courts consistently held that they could 
apply U.S. substantive law when either the relevant conduct took place in 
                                                                                                                     
34 See Austen L. Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1455, 1460–61 (2008) (“Condemned as incoherent and convoluted, a patchwork of incompatible rules 
presently governs legislative jurisdiction. Some scholars go so far as to describe the Court's 
extraterritoriality decisions as patently inconsistent, if not hopelessly confused.”); William S. Dodge, 
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 90 (1998) 
(“[O]nly the notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind is a legitimate 
basis for the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . . [A]cts of Congress should presumptively apply 
only to conduct that causes effects within the United States regardless of where that conduct occurs.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
35 See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1673, 
1674 (2012) (“To be sure, significant and vigorous debate existed at the margins over the extent to which 
constitutional provisions constrained congressional action and over how courts should interpret a statute's 
geographic reach in the face of congressional silence. But while those debates played out at the periphery, 
the core doctrine remained untouched.”); Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to A Flame? International 
Securities Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court's “Transactional Test,” 52 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 405, 422 (2012) (“[N]otwithstanding the undeniable problems accompanying the conduct-
effects test, [it did not pose] a significant threat in terms of excessive extension of American jurisprudence 
that was in conflict with the sovereignty of other jurisdictions . . . [and was not] a strain on American 
courts that were called on to resolve primarily foreign disputes.”). 
36 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013) (applying the Morrison 
presumption to the Alien Tort Statute, even though that statute is “strictly jurisdictional,” and “does not 
directly regulate conduct or afford relief” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)); 
id. at 124–25 (“And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must 
do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”); RJR 
Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (noting that the Court applies the 
Morrison presumption “across the board”); id. at 2103 (“This unique structure makes RICO the rare 
statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of 
extraterritoriality.”). 
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the U.S. or the effects were felt here. 
The notion of a presumption against extraterritoriality did not originate 
with the Morrison Court. But Morrison revived the old concept and 
transformed it into something new and distinct from its previous 
incarnations. The presumption against extraterritoriality as a concept in 
American law dates back at least to 1824 when Justice Story applied it to 
limit the reach of U.S. customs laws.37 Justice Holmes delivered perhaps 
“the most famous modern statement of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality”38 in American Banana v. United Fruit, in which he noted 
“the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful 
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the 
act is done,” requiring “a construction of any statute as intended to be 
confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the 
lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”39 
“However, the influence of the presumption soon began to wane.”40 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court occasionally cited the principle in labor 
law cases,41 it all but ignored it in antitrust cases.42 Judge Learned Hand gave 
the most famous formulation of the “effects” test in United States v. Alcoa, 
where he wrote that “any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not 
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences 
within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states 
will ordinarily recognize.”43 Judge Henry Friendly gave the most famous 
formulation of the “conduct” test in Leasco Data v. Maxwell, where he wrote 
that when “there has been significant conduct within the territory, a statute 
cannot properly be held inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent the 
clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have meant to go beyond 
the limits recognized by foreign relations law.”44 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law sought to sum up the 
U.S. approach: A state had a reasonable basis to apply its own law to 
“conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory,”45 
                                                                                                                     
37 See The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) (“The laws of no nation can justly extend 
beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the 
sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction.”). 
38 Dodge, supra note 34, at 85. 
39 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1909). 
40 Dodge, supra note 34, at 85. 
41 See, e.g., Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949) (reasoning that Congress 
intended to apply domestic labor laws only to domestic workers); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 
29, 31 (1925) (noting that Federal Employers’ Liability Act does not have extraterritorial force). 
42 See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275–76 (1927) (making no mention 
of the presumption); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283–87 (1952) (declining to rigorously 
apply the presumption to the Lanham Act). 
43 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
44 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). 
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
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or “conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial 
effect within its territory.”46 However, this principle had limits. The 
Restatement provided that, even if a state had a reasonable basis to apply its 
law, “a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a 
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise 
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable” and laid out non-exhaustive factors for 
evaluating unreasonableness.47 The Restatement concluded that “[w]hen it 
would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over 
a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, 
each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state’s 
interest in exercising jurisdiction,” and that “a state should defer to the other 
state if that state’s interest is clearly greater.”48 
B. The New Old Extraterritoriality – The Presumption 
In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed poised to significantly alter the 
reach of U.S. law. In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), the 
Court held that federal anti-discrimination law did not apply to a claim made 
by a U.S. national against a U.S. corporation because the discriminatory 
conduct had occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.49 The Court invoked 
the “presumption against extraterritoriality,” which it defined as the 
principle that a U.S. statue must be presumed to be “primarily concerned 
with domestic conditions”, unless Congress has “clearly expressed” its 
“affirmative intention” that the law should apply extraterritorially.50 Justice 
Marshall, joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, dissented, arguing that 
the majority “converts the presumption against extraterritoriality into a 
clear-statement rule in part through selective quotation,” and “also 
overstates the strength of the presumption by drawing on language from 
cases involving a wholly independent rule of construction,” the so-called 
Charming Betsy canon, that “an act of congress ought never to be construed 
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”51  
                                                                                                                     
46 Id. § 402(1)(c). In addition to these bases for prescriptive jurisdiction, the Restatement also 
provided for so-called “passive personality” and “special . . . interests” jurisdiction. Id. § 402 cmt. g 
(introducing the “passive personality principle”); id. § 402 cmt. a (applying the “special . . . interests” 
jurisdiction to subsection (c)). See also id. § 402(2)–(3) (“[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with 
respect to . . . (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its 
territory; and (3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against 
the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.”). 
47 Id. § 403(1)–(2). 
48 Id. § 403(3). 
49 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 244, 248 (1991) (holding that Congress 
did not “intend[] the protections of Title VII to apply to United States citizens employed by American 
employers outside of the United States”). 
50 Id. at 248 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
51 Id. at 260, 263–64 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de 
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963)); see also Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 
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The Aramco decision landed with a profound thud. Congress overturned 
the result with amendments to the relevant antidiscrimination law. 52 The 
U.S. Supreme Court cited to the principle in a few subsequent cases.53 Two 
years later, in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, the Court applied the 
conduct-and-effects test to the U.S. antitrust law, proceeding almost as if 
Aramco had never been decided.54 The majority declined even to cite to 
Aramco. But although the presumption against extraterritoriality seemed 
dead, it “did but slumber.”55 
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court took up the presumption again in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank. The Court decided a legal issue of 
profound transnational significance in the context of particularly skewed 
facts (and not for the last time).56 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
described the conduct-and-effects test as “judicial-speculation-made-law—
divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation 
before the court,”57 and the results as “unpredictable and inconsistent.”58 He 
revived the presumption, stating that, “[r]ather than guess anew in each case, 
we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background 
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”59 
Justices Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg.60  In the face of 
these critiques, Justice Scalia sought to qualify the presumption, stating that 
it was not a “clear statement rule”, but rather required only a “clear 
                                                                                                                     
U.S. 138, 146–147 (1957) (refusing to “run interference in . . . [the] delicate field of international 
relations” without express intent from Congress to do so). 
52 Congress amended the definitions of Title VII to include U.S. citizens working overseas. Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)) (“With respect to 
employment in a foreign country, [the] term [employee] includes an individual who is a citizen of the 
United States.”). 
53 See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203–04 (1993) (noting the “longstanding principle” 
that laws should only apply within the “territorial jurisdiction of the United States” (citation omitted)); 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1993) (“Acts of Congress do not ordinarily 
apply outside our borders.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585–89 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (discussing Congressional intent in applying legislation to domestic activities only); see also 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440–41 (1989) (“[L]egislation of 
Congress . . . is meant to only apply within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” (citation 
omitted)). 
54 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (“[I]t is well established by now 
that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some 
substantial effect in the United States.”). 
55 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, act 2, sc. 6. 
56 See Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1098 (2015) (“In two 
recent cases involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign conduct (known as ‘foreign-
cubed’ cases), however, the Court solidified its retreat to territoriality.” (footnote omitted)). 
57 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010). 
58 Id. at 260–61. 
59 Id. at 261. 
60 Id. at 274. 
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indication of extraterritoriality.”61 The Court declined to give examples of 
such indications or to make clear how such an indication would differ from 
a clear statement, except to state that “[a]ssuredly context can be 
consulted.”62 
Morrison left open a great many questions, including whether the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applied to all statutes—a particular 
puzzle given that Court’s failure in Morrison to address its prior decision 
Hartford Fire. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Court seemed to 
answer that question with a resounding yes.63 In Kiobel, the Court held that 
the Morrison presumption applied to the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).64 The 
ATS is a transnational law mystery. The U.S. Congress enacted it in 1789, 
stating in full: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States.”65 Debates continue as to what this was 
originally designed to address66 and as to what work it can do today.67 
Nonetheless, the ATS is clearly different from the securities law at issue 
in Morrison. The ATS addresses transnational issues—it allows U.S. courts 
to entertain causes of action only for “an alien” and only for a tort “in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”68 The ATS 
is also, in part, a jurisdictional statute: It vests district courts with original 
jurisdiction over a certain class of disputes.69 
The Court did not see Morrison and Kiobel as different, simply 
extending the “principles underlying the presumption against 
                                                                                                                     
61 See id. at 265 (“But we do not say, as the concurrence seems to think, that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is a ‘clear statement rule’. . . .”). 
62 Id.  
63 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013) (“[W]e think the principles 
underlying the [presumption against extraterritoriality] similarly constrain courts considering causes of 
action that may be brought under the ATS.”). 
64 Id. at 116. 
65 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  
66 See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 830, 836 (2006) (“The statute was not enacted to redress piracy or infringements of ambassadorial 
rights. Safe conducts have been almost entirely neglected in the literature . . . .”). 
67 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational 
Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1051 (2015) (stating that federal courts, under 
the ATS, have jurisdiction over cases regarding genocide, war crimes, and torture); Roger P. Alford, The 
Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1751–52 (2014) 
(arguing that “foreign tort laws will apply to the typical human rights claims that were pursued under the 
ATS” and that relief under ATS will likely not apply to “foreign human rights victims”). 
68 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  
69 See Pamela K. Bookman, Agora: Reflections on RJR Nabisco v. European Community Doubling 
Down on Litigation Isolationism, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 57, 58 (2016) (noting that, prior to the 
Court’s RJR Nabisco decision, “Kiobel might have been an outlier because the purely jurisdictional 
statute at issue was the extraordinary Alien Tort Statute, and the Court made this extension in large part 
because the Court had previously held that the Alien Tort Statute permitted the courts to create a cause 
of action” (footnote omitted)). 
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extraterritoriality” to constrain “courts exercising their power under the 
ATS.”70 However, the Court failed to articulate a clear rule for the 
application of the Morrison presumption to the ATS. The Court affirmed 
that the ATS was not wholly an empty “shelf”71—but that “even where the 
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so 
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.”72 The Court declined to give any guidance as to what sorts of 
claims would meet this test, except to say that mere “corporate presence” of 
a defendant was not enough.73 The Court also declined to explain how 
Morrison’s pure “canon of statutory interpretation”74 could be “displaced” 
by a particular constellation of facts.75 
In RJR Nabisco v. European Community, the Court’s next decision on 
the presumption, the Court held that a statute may contain “a clear, 
affirmative indication” that it applies extraterritorially, and yet apply 
extraterritorially “only to the extent that the predicates alleged in a particular 
case themselves apply extraterritorially.”76 In RJR Nabisco, the European 
Community prevailed on the issue that had consumed the lower courts’ 
attention—whether the Morrison presumption cabined RICO’s 
application.77 But it still lost. The manner of its defeat illustrates an 
important point about Morrison and its application. The presumption against 
extraterritoriality—the main issue in Morrison and the preoccupation of 
scholars and lower courts attempting to interpret Morrison—did not decide 
the case. Rather, it was the so-called “focus test” that scuttled the European 
Community’s suit.78 
                                                                                                                     
70 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013). 
71 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719 (2004) (“[T]he First Congress did not pass the 
ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state 
legislature that might, someday, authorize the creation of causes of action . . . .”). 
72 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. 
73 See id. at 125 (“Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to 
say that mere corporate presence suffices.”). 
74 Id. at 115.  
75 Id. at 131.  
76 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016).  
77 Id. at 2093. 
78 Id. at 2111 (“Section 1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury 
to business or property and does not allow recovery for foreign injuries.”). The Court’s most recent 
extraterritoriality decision, WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical, also places the focus test front-and-center. 
138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018). The Court in RJR Nabisco noted in dicta that, some instances, in might be 
appropriate for a court to analyze the “focus test” before considering whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality had been rebutted. See 136 S.Ct., at 2101, n. 5. The Court in WesterGeco did exactly 
that, noting that “addressing step one would require resolving ‘difficult questions’ that do not change 
‘the outcome of the case,’ but could have far-reaching effects in future cases. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 
2129 at 2136 (quoting RJR Nabisco, 555 U.S. at 236–237)). The Court declined to consider whether the 
“presumption against extraterritoriality should never apply to statutes . . . that merely provide a general 
damages remedy for conduct that Congress has declared unlawful. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136. 
Rather, the Court proceeded directly to consider the focus of the remedial portion of the Patent Act. The 
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C. Extraterritoriality’s Distorted Reflection – The Focus Test 
Morrison resurrected the presumption against extraterritoriality—
sometimes called “Morrison Step-One.”79 But Morrison also introduced a 
new “Step-Two.” The Morrison Court instructed lower courts to, first, 
determine whether a “clear, affirmative indication” rebutted the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, and if not, to determine whether the particular 
facts of the case presented a “domestic application” of the statute.80 
To answer the question of what constituted a “domestic application,” the 
Court adopted the “rather simplistic ‘focus’ test.”81 Justice Scalia directed 
the lower courts to look to the “object of the statute’s solicitude.”82 It would 
not be sufficient that the case merely “had some domestic contact”—for the 
Morrison presumption “would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated 
into its kennel” at the threat of merely some domestic connections.83 
Therefore, the second step of Morrison would actually require two 
analytical steps. First, a court would be required to assess the “objects of the 
statute’s solicitude”—to state what precisely a statute is about.84 Second, the 
court would make a factual determination as to whether the particular 
“objects” in the instant case were within the territorial boundaries on the 
United States or not. The Morrison Court introduced this test with little 
explanation, most likely under the impression that these were simple 
questions. In fact, Morrison’s focus test has introduced two types of 
uncertainty, statutory uncertainty and descriptive uncertainty. Because of the 
particular context of Morrison, the Court viewed both inquiries as simple. 
Neither has proved to be. 
The Morrison case concerned publicly traded securities—equities 
bought and sold on public, regulated exchanges. The Court held that “it is in 
our view only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and 
domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”85 In 
other words, the Court held that the “focus” of the Securities Exchanges Act 
of 1934, section 10(b) was the regulation of the proper functioning of the 
                                                                                                                     
majority and dissent disagreed, without evident irony, about what “focus” was dictated by the “plain 
text” of the statute. 
79 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (“Morrison and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for 
analyzing extraterritoriality issues. At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that 
it applies extraterritorially.”). 
80 See id. (“If the statute is not extraterritorial, then at the second step we determine whether the 
case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’”). 
81 Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring), vacated as moot sub nom. U.S. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
82 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267. 
83 Id. at 266. 
84 Id. at 267. 
85 Id.  
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exchange itself.86 This was not necessarily an obvious conclusion—
plaintiffs argued that the injuries to defrauded parties should at least also be 
a “focus”87—but it was not especially difficult either. The Court prominently 
cited the work of Linda Silberman and Stephen Choi arguing that the 
exchange was the right object of “the statute’s solicitude” for purposes of 
both conflicts of law and deterring securities fraud.88 
Because the Court viewed this as a readily apparent conclusion, it gave 
little assistance to lower courts in this new search for the “objects of the 
statute’s solicitude.” The Court said only the mere presence of some 
domestic contacts could not suffice, though that was in the context of 
justifying the invention of the focus test itself.89 Lower courts interpreted 
Justice Scalia’s pungent dicta to require that they avoid any application of 
the focus test that would recapitulate the “conduct and effects” test—in other 
words, holding that the focuses of a statutes were both the relevant conduct 
and the resulting effects.90 But the Court did not lay down any interpretive 
guideposts, neglecting to say whether this inquiry should be particularly 
transnational nature. In short, it seemed pretty easy to the Court: Just say 
what the statute is about. 
II. DOMESTIC APPLICATION DISHARMONY 
The Court’s “rather simplistic”91 formulation of the focus test led 
immediately to confusion in and among the lower courts. Even in securities 
law—the subject of the Morrison opinion itself—the focus test has divided 
and perplexed the courts. 
A. The Domestic Off-exchange Transaction 
Post-Morrison securities cases demonstrate that, even where the U.S. 
Supreme Court has specified the statutory focus, significant problems 
remain. In Morrison, the Court held that, when the alleged fraud concerns 
exchange-traded securities, the object of U.S. regulatory law is the exchange 
                                                                                                                     
86 Id. at 266–67. 
87 See id. at 266 (articulating plaintiff’s argument that just because “§10(b) does not apply 
extraterritorially does not resolve the case.”). 
88 Id. at 260 (citing Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global 
Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 468 (2009)). 
89 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (“But the presumption against extraterritorial application would 
be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in 
the case.”). 
90 See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting 
that the conduct and effects test is defunct and applying a “transactional test” from Morrison that does 
not involve conduct nor effects). 
91 Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring), vacated as moot sub nom. U.S. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
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itself.92 However, the significant majority of all securities transactions do 
not occur on public exchanges—but are rather so-called “off-exchange 
transactions,” including all transactions in privately held entities. The Court 
consigned this entire category of transactions to a six word aside: “And it is 
in our view only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and 
domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”93 
The lower courts immediately splintered on the question of how to 
determine whether these “off-exchange” transactions were “domestic.” 
Modern securities transactions very rarely take place in person—the “place 
of closing” is an anachronism—but are rather negotiated, drafted, and signed 
over e-mail and by PDF. Litigants looked to numerous territorial proxies94 
in their attempts to localize these transactions, including the place of the 
broker-dealer, the closing, the parties, or the issuer.95 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an off-exchange 
transaction is located where “irrevocable liability was incurred or title was 
transferred,”96 and emphasized that the “transactional test announced in 
Morrison does not require” conduct in the United States.97 
Two years later, the court retreated from this conclusion, holding that 
“while a domestic transaction or listing is necessary to state a claim under § 
10(b), a finding that these transactions were domestic would not suffice to 
compel the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ invocation of § 10(b) was 
appropriately domestic.”98 The court’s test had not been a model of clarity 
before and now the one clear element of its holding—that conduct was 
irrelevant—was withdrawn. These off-exchange transaction cases illustrate 
                                                                                                                     
92 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (indicating that the focus of the Exchange Act is the “purchase 
and sales of securities in the United States”). 
93 Id. at 267 (emphasis added). 
94 Chris Brummer, Territoriality As A Regulatory Technique: Notes from the Financial Crisis, 79 
U. CIN. L. REV. 499, 502 (2010) (“Defining geographic borders for regulatory purposes is not always a 
straightforward matter. Instead, jurisdiction over financial matters often arises through what can be 
described as territorial proxies.”) 
95 See Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 68 (rejecting plaintiffs’ suggestion that “the location of the 
broker-dealer should be used to locate securities transactions [because] [w]hile we agree that the location 
of the broker could be relevant to the extent that the broker carries out tasks that irrevocably bind the 
parties to buy or sell securities, the location of the broker alone does not necessarily demonstrate where 
a contract was executed.”). The court also rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that “the identity of the securities 
should be used to determine whether a securities transaction is domestic and that where, as in this case, 
the securities are issued by United States companies and are registered with the SEC, the transactions are 
domestic within the meaning of Morrison.” Id. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ argument was 
“belied by the wording of the test announced in Morrison” which emphasized “domestic transactions in 
other securities” and not other transactions in domestic securities. Id. at 68–69 (citation omitted).  
96 Id. at 69 (“Accordingly, rather than looking to the identity of the parties, the type of security at 
issue, or whether each individual defendant engaged in conduct within the United States, we hold that a 
securities transaction is domestic when the parties incur irrevocable liability to carry out the transaction 
within the United States or when title is passed within the United States.”). 
97 Id. 
98 Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 216 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 
 2019] THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY FORMALISMS 391 
that a “regulatory focus” may appear workable in one application—but 
impossibly complex in others.  
B. The Domestic Racketeering Enterprise 
The RICO litigation in European Community illustrates both the 
statutory and descriptive uncertainty introduced by Morrison. RICO 
requires a “pattern of racketeering activity” by a criminal “enterprise” as 
elements of the independent cause of action created by the statute.99 The 
lower courts remain split on whether the “regulatory focus” of the statute is 
the pattern or the enterprise. The answer, of course, is both.100 The United 
States government argued as much in its amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the European Community case.101 However, the Court’s holding did 
not require it to reach the issue, as it held that RICO’s substantive provision 
did, in some instances, apply extraterritorially.102 
Nonetheless, the Court did pause to criticize the theory that the 
“enterprise” constituted the RICO statute’s regulatory focus. 103 First, the 
Court noted that selecting the criminal “enterprise” would present 
predictable problems of localizing a diffuse and intangible “focus.”104 
Second, the Court noted that, even if a predictable means to locate the 
“enterprise” were devised, it would be too easy for racketeers to avoid RICO 
by moving their “enterprise” abroad.105 This would undermine the very 
purposes of the statute by permitting foreign racketeering to engage in 
conduct with the United States without the threat of the most applicable U.S. 
                                                                                                                     
99 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2096–97 (2016). 
100 Compare United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
appropriate “focus” of the RICO statute is the pattern of racketeering activity), with Cedeno v. Intech 
Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd sub nom. Cedeno v. Castillo, 457 F. App’x 
35 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the appropriate “focus” of the RICO statute is the criminal “enterprise”). 
101 See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur at 9, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European 
Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), at *9 (“Contrary to petitioners’ claim, RICO contains no domestic-
enterprise requirement. RICO’s ‘focus’ is on the ‘pattern’ as well as the enterprise. Accordingly, if a 
pattern of domestic racketeering activity occurs, RICO may be violated whether the enterprise is foreign 
or domestic.” (internal citation omitted)). 
102 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102–03 (2016) (holding that RICO may apply extraterritorially). As 
described below, the Court held that the focus of RICO’s private right of action provision is the injury 
sustained from the racketeering activity. See infra Section III(A) (discussing the RJR Nabisco holding). 
103 The Court further noted that the statutory “indication” of extraterritoriality need not be found in 
the portion of the statute that concerns its focus. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103 (2016) (“This 
argument misunderstands Morrison . . . . [O]nly at the second step of the inquiry do we consider a 
statute’s ‘focus.’ Here, however, there is a clear indication at step one that RICO applies extraterritorially. 
We therefore do not proceed to the ‘focus’ step.”). 
104 See id. at 2104 (“It is easy to see why Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enterprises. A 
domestic enterprise requirement would lead to difficult line-drawing problems and counterintuitive 
results . . . . RJR also offers no satisfactory way of determining whether an enterprise is foreign or 
domestic.”). 
105 Id. (“It would exclude from RICO’s reach foreign enterprises—whether corporations, crime 
rings, other associations, or individuals—that operate within the United States.”). 
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law.106 
C. The Domestic Fraudulent Conveyance 
Currently, the central issue on the ongoing Madoff receivership is 
whether the Trustee for the defunct Madoff brokerage can claw back 
payments made to foreign investors as part of the Madoff Ponzi scheme. 
These foreign investors typically made their investment in the Madoff 
brokerage though foreign “feeder funds,” themselves Cayman or British 
Virgin Islands entities.107 These investors were then paid through the foreign 
feeder funds.108 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
recently held that the clawback provision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code could 
reach these transactions because of the “focus” of the statute was 
domestic.109 
Section 550 of the Code empowers the Trustee to clawback any funds 
fraudulently transferred that would have constituted “the property of the 
estate,”110 defined to include property “wherever located and by whomever 
held . . . .”111 This statutory language may well constitute a “clear indication” 
that the Morrison presumption is rebutted, particularly in light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding in RJR Nabisco that statutory language 
incorporated by reference can meet this bar.112 But if it does not—as the 
                                                                                                                     
106 Id. (“Congress, after all, does not usually exempt foreigners acting in the United States from 
U.S. legal requirements.”); see also European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 
2014) (“Surely the presumption against extraterritorial application of United States laws does not 
command giving foreigners carte blanche to violate the laws of the United States in the United States.”), 
rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
107 Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 513 B.R. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
108 Id. 
109 See Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Nos. 08-01789 (SMB), 11-02760 
(SMB), 2017 WL 3084395, at *2–3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2017) (order withdrawing May 4, 2017 
memorandum decision denying request to certify judgment for direct appeal to the Second Circuit). 
110 See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2) (2012) (“[T]he trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the 
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property.”).  
111 Id. § 541(a) (2012). 
112 Other Courts of Appeals have so held. See, e.g., In re French, 440 F.3d 145, 152 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(“Congress thus demonstrated an affirmative intention to allow avoidance of transfers of foreign property 
that, but for a fraudulent transfer, would have been property of the debtor's estate. Therefore, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality does not prevent application of § 548 here.”). In the Madoff 
litigation, law professors (including this one) have supported such a result. See Brief of Professors of 
Conflict of Laws as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 17, In re: Picard, No. 17-2992 (2d Cir. 
2018), 2018 WL 564701 (“Section 550(a) [c]ontains a [c]lear [i]ndication of [e]xtraterritoriality.”). But 
see Michael J. Colarossi, An Uncertain Future: The Questionable Extraterritoriality of the Bankruptcy 
Code's Core Pre-Petition Avoidance Provisions, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229, 272–73 (2017) 
(“Irrespective of whether Congress actually intended the avoidance provisions to apply extraterritorially, 
the Supreme Court seems fully committed to barring such application absent an unmistakable instruction 
of Congress’ pro-extraterritorial intent.”). 
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lower court held113—the question of the “regulatory focus” of section 550 of 
the Code is placed squarely before the courts. 
The Trustee argued before the lower courts that the proper regulatory 
focus of section 550 of the Code is the estate itself. The district court held 
that the regulatory focus is the ultimate transaction—the final transfer from 
the foreign feeder fund to the foreign investor.114 In another case, the same 
S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Judge as in the Madoff case held that the regulatory 
focus is the initial transfer that depletes the estate—in other words, the 
transfer from the Madoff brokerage to the foreign feeder funds (opening a 
split within the S.D.N.Y.).115 The United State Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that it had overlooked the 
necessary link between the Code’s substantive avoidance provisions and the 
recovery provision embodied in section 550.116 Doing so, the appellate court 
held that the focus of section 550 was the initial transfer that depletes the 
estate.117 
The Code is clearly concerned with the estate, transfers that deplete the 
estate, and the liability of transferees. Section 550 itself speaks to all three 
elements, “the benefit of the estate,” “the property transferred,” and in the 
title of the section “Liability of transferee of avoided transfer.”118 The 
appellate court and the district court each supposed that a plain text reading 
of the Code clearly supplied any answer to the focus inquiry, but the 
vigorous disagreement of judges and commentators belies this supposed 
                                                                                                                     
113 See Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS), 480 B.R. 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding 
that the focus of the section 550 of the Code was the initial transfer and that the Morrison presumption 
was rebutted by the language of the statute (Lifland, J.)), Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. BLMIS (In re 
BLMIS), 513 B.R. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) supplemented by 12-MC-115, 2014 WL 3778155 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 28, 2014) (holding that the focus of the section 550 of the Code was the ultimate transfer and that 
the Morrison presumption was not rebutted by the language of the statute (Rakoff, J.)), on remand Sec. 
Inv'r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. AP 08-01789 (SMB), 2016 WL 6900689, at 
*1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016) (“I do not write on a clean slate.” (Bernstein, J.), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. In re Picard, Tr. for Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 917 F.3d 85 
(2d Cir. 2019) (holding that the focus of Section 550 is the initial transfer), Weisfelner v. Blavatnik, (In 
re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 543 B.R. 127 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that the fraudulent transfer 
provision of the Code did apply extraterritorially (Gerber, J.)), In re Ampal-Am. Israel Corp., 562 B.R. 
601, 613 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that the focus of the Code’s fraudulent transfer provision is 
the initial transfer and that the Morrison presumption is not rebutted (Bernstein, J.)). See also Edward R. 
Morrison, Extraterritorial Avoidance Actions: Lessons From Madoff, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 
268, 271 (Fall 2014). 
114 Id. at 228. 
115 See In re Ampal-Am. Israel Corp., 562 B.R. 601, 613 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017), BLI, 480 B.R. at 
524; see also supra at note 113. 
116 In re Picard, Tr. for Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 17-2992(L), 2019 WL 
903978, at *8 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2019) (“The Appellees would have us ignore § 548(a)(1)(A) entirely and 
look only to § 550(a)(2).”) 
117 See id. 
118 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012). 
 
 394 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:2 
clarity.119 Plainly, further tools are needed to either supplement this analysis 
or, better still, to recognize the fictive nature of any attempt to divine a single 
focus from a complicated regulatory regime. 
D. The Domestic Right to Privacy 
U.S. prosecutors requested a “warrant”120 under the Stored 
Communications Protection Act (SCPA) to obtain e-mail data relevant to a 
drug conspiracy prosecution. The data was under the control of Microsoft, 
which stated that it was principally associated with one of its servers in 
Dublin, Ireland.121 All parties agreed that the procedure provided for in the 
SCPA did not apply extraterritorially.122 The question of whether the 
prosecutors could obtain the information therefore turned on whether the 
“objects of the statute’s solicitude” were domestic or not.123 
Microsoft argued that the regulatory focus of the SCPA was the data 
itself, which was “located” in Dublin at the servers with which the data is 
principally associated.124 The U.S. prosecutors argued that the focus was 
production of documents125—and the “place of production” would be a 
terminal located at Microsoft’s offices in the U.S. where a Microsoft 
employee would be directed to access the data. The United State Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held the the focus was “the invasion of 
privacy.”126 The court located this “invasion” at the place of the Irish 
servers.127 
The court’s decision was swiftly criticized by other courts, which did 
not follow it.128 It was also attacked by other members of the same court, 
                                                                                                                     
119 See supra, at note 113. 
120 See Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The Warrant directed Microsoft to seize and produce 
the contents of an e-mail account that it maintains for a customer who uses the company's electronic 
communications services . . . . The [w]arrant was then served on Microsoft at its headquarters in 
Redmond, Washington.”), vacated as moot sub nom. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). In 
addition to issues discussed in this paper, there has been significant disagreement as to the nature of this 
authority at all, as it seems to partake of both the warrant and the subpoena procedures. See, e.g., 
Grimmelmann, infra note 133 (discussing the warrant authority under the Stored Communications Act). 
121 Microsoft Warrant, 829 F.3d at 204. 
122 Id. at 209. 
123 Id. at 216. 
124 Id. at 204. 
125 See id. at 228 (Lynch, J., concurring) (“The government quite reasonably argues that the focus . 
. . [is] on the place where the service provider discloses the information to the government, as 
requested.”). 
126 Id. at 220. 
127 Id. 
128 See In re Search Warrant No. 16–960–M–01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 719 (E.D. Pa. 
2017)  (“In contrast to the decision in Microsoft, this court holds that the disclosure by Google of the 
electronic data relevant to the warrants at issue here constitutes neither a ‘seizure’ nor a ‘search’ of the 
targets’; [sic] data in a foreign country.”). 
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who argued in several separate dissents from denial of rehearing en banc, 
that it was “not marginally more useful than thinking of Santa Claus as a 
denizen of the North Pole,”129 and a severe restriction on “an essential 
investigative tool used thousands of times a year [in] important criminal 
investigations around the country.”130 A recent online symposium on the 
Microsoft case featured scholars of criminal procedure, civil procedure, 
conflict of laws, intellectual property, and information technology—none 
endorsed the appellate court’s holding.131 The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.132 Though, as one scholar put it, when “I realized that the Supreme 
Court had granted certiorari in an electronic evidence case that turned on 
extraterritoriality, I buried my head in my hands.”133 
This despair turned to be premature thanks to an unlikely hero: The 
United States Congress. On March 23, 2018, Congress passed and the 
President signed (as part of the omnibus spending bill) the Clarifying Lawful 
Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act of 2018.134 The CLOUD Act mooted 
the litigation on the reach of the SCA by specifying that an order under the 
SCA applies to all data that is in the “possession, custody, or control” of the 
provider, regardless of where that data is stored.135 The bill thus “rejects any 
distinction between data stored in the United States and data stored abroad,” 
and instead “lists eight factors courts must consider when deciding whether 
to quash a demand for stored data that might set up a conflict between United 
States and foreign law, including the customer’s location and nationality, the 
provider’s ties to the United States, and the availability of alternative 
means.”136 The bill also contains a mechanism to “pave the way for 
executive agreements . . . to allow foreign governments to request content 
directly from American providers.”137 
                                                                                                                     
129 Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 855 F.3d 53, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“Localizing the data in Ireland is not 
marginally more useful than thinking of Santa Claus as a denizen of the North Pole. Problems arise if 
one over-thinks the problem, reifying the notional: Where in the world is a Bitcoin? Where in my DVR 
are the images and voices? Where are the snows of yesteryear?”). 
130 Id. at 63 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“To top this off, the panel 
majority’s decision does not serve any serious, legitimate, or substantial privacy interest.”). 
131 Andrew Pincus et al., Special Feature: Symposium Before the Oral Argument in United States 
v. Microsoft, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 9, 2018, 2:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-
features/symposium-before-the-oral-argument-in-united-states-v-microsoft/. 
132 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (granting petition for a writ of certiorari). 
133 James Grimmelmann, The Parties in U.S. v. Microsoft Are Misinterpreting the Stored 
Communications Act’s Warrant Authority, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/52429/parties-u-s-v-microsoft-misinterpret-sca-warrant-authority/.  
134 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2012). 
135 Andrew Keane Woods & Peter Swire, The CLOUD Act: A Welcome Legislative Fix for Cross-
Border Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/cloud-act-welcome-
legislative-fix-cross-border-data-problems. 
136 Grimmelmann, supra note 133. 
137 Woods & Swire, supra note 135. 
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Justice Scalia might have defended this legislative intervention as the 
sort of reaction by democratically accountable elected officials that he 
celebrated. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, as the Court has pushed ever 
more toward territorially-bounded approaches, the legislature has moved 
away. After Aramco, after Morrison, and after Microsoft, the legislature 
overturned these decisions, in part or in whole, by shifting the focus away 
from simple territorial location.138 Initiatives by other legislatures have taken 
a similar approach. And yet, the U.S. Supreme Court seems determined to 
march further down the path of territorial formalism. 
There may be many reasons for courts to institute a particular canon or 
presumption, including that it avoids clashes with international law or 
reflects concerns of international comity. Indeed, these were justifications 
for earlier versions of the presumption.139 However, Justice Scalia justified 
the Morrison revolution on the basis that it was descriptively accurate. He 
noted that the presumption reflected the assumption that Congress is 
“primarily concerned with domestic conditions.”140 If the new presumption 
were not descriptively accurate, it would have been far more difficult to 
justify such a dramatic change to the allegedly “stable background against 
which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”141 
If the presumption was intended to be a stable background, it has elicited 
a sustained preference. Congress may be principally concerned with 
“domestic conditions,” but each time it has legislated in the face the 
presumption’s application, it has registered a desire to move away the 
formalisms imposed by the new test. 
III. THE FOCUS FORMALISMS 
In Morrison, the focus test was “rather simplistic”142—but that 
simplicity could have led to flexibility in application.143 Instead, the further 
iterations of Morrison’s second step have encrusted it with formalisms, like 
so many barnacles. In some instances, these formalisms have come from the 
Supreme Court itself. In others, they seem to have congealed in the lower 
                                                                                                                     
138 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa, 80b-14 (2012) (shifting extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
139 See William S. Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, __ HARV. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 9) (noting that “over time, the presumption against extraterritoriality 
has changed significantly,” and has evolved “from a rule based on international law, to a canon of comity, 
to an approach for determining legislative intent”). 
140 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (quoting Aramco, 111 S.Ct. 1227). 
141 Id. at 261. See Dodge, supra note 139, manuscript at Section III (analyzing Morrison as a change 
to the presumption against extraterritoriality canon of interpretation).  
142 Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring), vacated as moot sub nom. U.S. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
143 See Dodge, supra note 139, manuscript at 7 (“I argue that academic criticisms of the new 
presumption are misguided. The Morrison/RJR version of the presumption is significantly more flexible 
than its Aramco and American Banana predecessors, and thus decidedly better.”). 
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courts for no articulable reason. As we approach Morrison’s ten-year 
anniversary, the focus test resembles a mutant purposivisim. Lower courts 
attempt to locate the statute’s principal aim—but do so through the lens of 
formalist restrictions that privilege irrelevant facts, impose interpretative 
hurdles, and force bizarre conclusions. 
A. The Atomized Focus 
The RJR Nabisco majority itself added one of these barnacles. The RJR 
Nabisco majority endorsed the argument that the private right of action 
provision of RICO, § 1964(c), had to itself have a “regulatory focus.”144 Both 
the decision below and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argued that it made no 
sense to layer requirements upon requirements when, as the Supreme Court 
had previously held, “the compensable injury addressed by § 1964(c) 
necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to 
constitute a pattern.”145 The majority overruled the lower court,146 relying 
principally on amicus briefs filed thirteen years earlier in a different case by 
Germany and the United Kingdom.147 The majority compounded the scope 
of the Morrison presumption—applying it to all federal statutes—with a 
blatant legal fiction—that Congress legislates with a particularly “regulatory 
focus” in mind for each section of each regulatory statute. The Court could 
have dealt with its stated concern, avoiding conflict with other sovereigns, 
in far more transparent ways than by requiring that Morrison’s concept of a 
“regulatory focus” be atomized across every section and subsection of every 
statute. 
B. The Single Focus 
A second formalism is traceable to the U.S. Supreme Court, though not 
                                                                                                                     
144 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016). 
145 Id. at 2108 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 
473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985)); id. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495). 
146 The issue of the “focus” of RICO’s private right of action provision was not initially raised in 
the RJR Nabisco case at all. Rather, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals held that they 
had to consider the focus of the private right of action provision in the Commodities Exchange Act. See 
Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Loginovskaya argues that Morrison 
governs substantive (conduct-regulating) provisions rather than procedural provisions such as § 22. 
Morrison, however, draws no such distinction . . . . (Jacobs, J.)), Id. at 277 (“In my view, Kiobel, on 
which the majority relies, actually endorses the distinction between ‘substantive provisions and those 
that only create a cause of action,’ Majority Op. at 272, and underscores that the presumption applies 
only to the former.” (Lohier, J., dissenting)). The United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
denied the petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, with Judge Hall, a member of the original 
panel, concurring to address the argument from Loginovskaya. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 
Inc., 783 F.3d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 2015).  
147 Id. at 2107 n.9 (2016). At argument, Justice Breyer questioned whether the European 
Community had sufficiently consulted with its member states before instituting the suit. Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 31, RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (No. 15-138). 
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directly attributable to it. Lower courts seem to have assumed that each 
statute (or perhaps each section of each statute) can only have a single 
regulatory focus. The Morrison majority did not state that each statute (or 
each section of a statute, after RJR Nabisco) must have a “singular” focus, 
but “apparently assumed that there can be only one.”148 Perhaps the 
“singular” focus requirement was an unstated assumption—but perhaps not. 
Perhaps Morrison was merely an example of one application of one statute 
in which there happened to be only one focus. After all, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion referred to the “objects”—plural—of the statute’s solicitude.149 
The rhetoric used and sources cited by the Morrison majority suggest as 
much. Morrison emphasized repeatedly the importance of international 
comity—a theme similarly emphasized by Professors Silberman and Choi 
in their article cited prominently by the Court.150 Silberman and Choi make 
two points, one grounded in conflict of laws and the other in substantive 
securities law. First, they argue that, for purposes of balancing concerns of 
comity, the exchange is the appropriate focus of the Act.151  Second, they 
argue that, to achieve the appropriate level of securities fraud deterrence, the 
exchange is the appropriate regulatory target.152 Their argument is expressly 
tailored to the question of equity securities traded on a public exchange and 
do not suggest that a “singular” focus is a trans-substantive153 requirement 
of the domestic application inquiry.154 Seen in this light, the long-standing 
and continuing fight over whether RICO regulates a racketeering enterprise 
or a pattern of racketeering activity seems foolish. RICO regulates both—
the notion that Congress envisioned only one regulatory focus is a legal 
fiction that serves no obvious aim.155 
                                                                                                                     
148 Pamela Bookman, Microsoft Ireland: Extraterritoriality Step Zero, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 16, 
2018), http://www.justsecurity.org/52478/extraterritoriality-step/ (accessed Mar. 15, 2018) (Highlander 
reference in original). 
149 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010) (emphasis added). 
150 Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation & Global Securities Class-
Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465 (2009). 
151 See id. at 501 (“[A]n exchange-based rule gives courts a simple rule of thumb to follow.”). 
152 See id. at 497 (“Another divergence between the private deterrence incentives under an 
exchange-based rule lies with the expense of litigation.”). 
153 It may be a bad idea in general to imply trans-substantive doctrines where they are not expressly 
required. See generally Aaron Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 325 
(2018). 
154 The language of the Act itself, as interpreted in Morrison, also supports such a conclusion. As 
the Morrison majority observes, the Act regulates only fraud and the resulting injuries “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). In other words, the fraudulent conduct and its effects would be wholly behind the reach of the 
statute but for the purchase and sale of securities. Therefore, in this particular statute, it may well have 
made sense to select the singular focus of the exchange. 
155 See Aaron D. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 259, 269–70 (2015) 
(examining Lon Fuller’s critique of legal fictions, including the distinction between a presumption, which 
is rebuttable, and a fiction, which is not).  
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C. The Sufficient Focus 
Two further formalisms flowed from Morrison—though these have 
already been questioned by the lower courts grappling with Morrison’s 
aftermath. Morrison announced a “transactional test” for the Act—but, as 
discussed above, it is unlikely that the Morrison majority intended to 
institute a transactional test for every statute (if the Morrison majority even 
envisioned that the Morrison presumption would apply to every statute).156 
However, the lower courts read two additional formalisms into the Court’s 
emphasis on the “transaction test.” The lower courts initially interpreted 
Morrison to require a concrete, localizable focus. (Though, as discussed 
above, it is questionable whether many “transactions” can, in fact, be so 
localized.) The lower courts also initially interpreted the focus test to be the 
end of the domestic application inquiry—the determination of whether the 
“object of the statute’s solicitude” was within or without the United States 
was deemed sufficient to end the domestic application inquiry.157 Both of 
these formalisms have come under question in the subsequent cases. 
In Absolute Activist Master Fund v. Ficeto, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the Morrison test developed for 
publicly traded equities to off-exchange securities transactions.158 The court 
was already supplied (or saddled) with Morrison’s holding that the focus of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the “transaction.” In Morrison, this 
equated easily to the place of the exchange. In Absolute Activist Master 
Fund, the Second Circuit held that the transaction took place where 
“irrevocable liability was incurred or title was transferred.”159 But the court 
expressly rejected the argument that any contacts beyond the presence of the 
transaction were needed to ground a “domestic application” of the statute.160 
Simply put, the “transactional test announced in Morrison does not require” 
conduct in the United States.161 
The court retreated from this simple rule less than two years later. In 
Parkcentral v. Porche, the transactions were plainly domestic: swap 
                                                                                                                     
156 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267 (“The Court [in Morrison] held that ‘it is in our view only 
transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to 
which § 10(b) applies.’”); supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
157 See, e.g., Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting the argument that “it is still necessary to determine whether each individual defendant engaged 
in at least some conduct in the United States,” because “the transactional test announced in Morrison 
does not require that each defendant alleged to be involved in a fraudulent scheme engage in conduct in 
the United States.”). 
158 Id. at 66–67. 
159 Id. at 68–69 (“Accordingly, rather than looking to the identity of the parties, the type of security 
at issue, or whether each individual defendant engaged in conduct within the United States, we hold that 
a securities transaction is domestic when the parties incur irrevocable liability to carry out the transaction 
within the United States or when title is passed within the United States.”). 
160 Id. at 68. 
161 Id. at 69. 
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contracts in which every contact but the reference security was in the United 
States.162 The reference security was Volkswagen stock.163 (No party to the 
transaction actually held Volkswagen stock, making this a purely 
“synthetic” swap.)164 The defendant, Porsche, had fraudulently 
misrepresented that it had no intentions to acquire Volkswagen.165 In fact, 
Porsche was planning a takeover of Volkswagen.166 When these plans got 
out, Volkswagen momentarily became the most valuable company in the 
world.167 The swap counter-party betting the Volkswagen’s stock price 
would fall sued Porsche in U.S. court under U.S. securities law.168 After all, 
the transaction was clearly domestic.169 
The court declined to apply U.S. securities law.170 The court added an 
important qualification to Absolute Activist (and by extension, to Morrison 
itself): “[W]hile a domestic transaction or listing is necessary to state a claim 
under § 10(b), a finding that these transactions were domestic would not 
suffice to compel the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ invocation of § 10(b) was 
appropriately domestic.”171 Neither the Second Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme 
Court had considered the situation of a pure-third party to a domestic 
transaction who commits a fraud that is nevertheless “in connection with” 
that transaction.172 In that instance, the appeals court held that something 
additional—some conduct—was required.173 The Morrison decision derided 
                                                                                                                     
162 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit notes that the “plaintiffs have, to 
varying degrees, alleged that they entered into the swap agreements referencing VW shares in the United 
States,” including allegations that they “took all steps necessary to transact the securities-based swap 
agreements from their offices in New York City”; they “signed a confirmation required by [the] . . . swap 
counterparty in New York City”; their “swap transactions were entered into, terminated, and based 
entirely in the United States, with Deutsche Bank in New York acting as the counterparty”; their swap 
agreements were “entered into with New York-based Morgan Stanley in the United States”; their 
“counterparties were acting on behalf of financial institutions located in New York”; and their “swap 
agreements contained New York choice-of-law provisions and forum selection clauses designating New 
York federal and state courts as the forum in which legal disputes would be heard.” Parkcentral Glob. 
Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 2014). The court’s recitation 
demonstrated, among other things, that there is no agreement among very sophisticated hedge funds as 
to what defines a “domestic” U.S. swap contract.  
163 Id. at 201.  
164 Id. at 205. 
165 Id. at 201. 
166 Id.  
167 Id. at 205.  
168 Id. at 201.  
169 Id. at 207 (“[T]he securities-based swap agreements in this case [were] concluded domestically 
. . . .”).  
170 Id. at 216. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. at 217 (explaining that this situation is a “case of first impression”).  
173 See id. at 215–16 (explaining that “treating the location of a transaction as the definitive factor 
in the extraterritoriality inquiry[]” is a “problem” and holding that “a finding that these transactions were 
domestic would not suffice to compel the conclusion that . . . invocation of § 10(b) was appropriately 
domestic.”). 
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the combination of conduct and effects as too uncertain a rubric to evaluate 
extraterritoriality.174 Now, conduct was being combined with the 
metaphysical location of off-exchange transactions to ground precisely the 
same analysis—whether U.S. law should govern a dispute with both 
domestic and foreign connections.175 
In Parkcentral, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit unintentionally made a profound statement on the folly of attempting 
to reduce such a complex question to the location of transaction. The court 
noted that the “conclusion we have reached on these facts cannot, of course, 
be perfunctorily applied to other cases based on the perceived similarity of 
a few facts.”176 The court observed that, “[i]n a world of easy and rapid 
transnational communication and financial innovation, transactions in novel 
financial instruments – which market participants can freely invent to serve 
the market’s needs of the moment – can come in innumerable forms of which 
we are unaware and which we cannot possibly foresee.”177 Morrison’s 
promise of a simple, predictable, rules-based approach to extraterritorial 
application of securities law (let alone all laws) seemed to be slipping away. 
Indeed, the court stated that “[w]e do not purport to proffer a test that will 
reliably determine when a particular invocation of § 10(b) will be deemed 
appropriately domestic or impermissibly extraterritorial.”178 Other courts 
have agreed that the court failed to proffer a generally applicable test, and 
declined to apply what they characterize as Parkcentral’s “predominantly 
foreign” test.179 
The current draft Restatement (Fourth) of U.S. Foreign Relations law 
recognizes this erosion of Morrison’s promised simplicity. The new draft 
Restatement largely attempts to inter any case-by-case balancing of 
sovereign interests as inconsistent with recent U.S. Supreme case law. But 
in light of cases like Parkcentral, the Restatement acknowledges that 
“application of the presumption does not preclude U.S. courts from 
interpreting a statute to include other comity limitations if doing so is 
consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the provision.”180 The 
Restatement is ecumenical as to the form of these additional comity 
                                                                                                                     
174 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 259–61 (2010). 
175 AARON D. SIMOWITZ, RJR NABISCO V. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE REACH OF U.S. LAW, 
YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOLUME 17 (2016/2017), pp. 217–231, 226 (“There 
seemed to be a role for conduct, after all.”). 
176 Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 217. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 See, e.g., Vancouver Alumni Asset Holdings Inc. v. Daimler AG, No. CV 16-02942 SJO (KSx), 
2017 WL 2378369, at *11 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2017) (stating that “[d]efendants’ reliance on Parkcentral 
is misplaced—not just because the ‘predominantly foreign’ test is non-binding on this Court” but because 
the facts of Parkcentral are distinguishable). 
180 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 405 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2018). 
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limitations, noting that “U.S. courts have construed statutory provisions to 
include a variety of other comity limitations depending on the text, history, 
and purpose of the particular provision.”181 This is a welcome 
acknowledgement of the irreducible complexity of the extraterritoriality 
analysis—but it also a statement that the Morrison test is neither complete 
nor sufficient to determine issue of extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
D. The Localizable Focus 
The last formalism is the legal fiction that all “objects” are reducible a 
physical location in space—that they are localizable. This is plainly false.182 
Courts have made a similar error with regard to intangible assets and 
personal jurisdiction, where the attempt “to imagine the situs of an asset with 
no actual situs is a logical error with predictably confusing and arbitrary 
results.”183 The legal fiction of situs should be discarded for personal 
jurisdiction.184 Unfortunately, the very nature of Morrison’s “focus test” 
may prevent courts from doing so for extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
But not so for Congress. Morrison is a default rule of statutory 
interpretation for federal statutes—it is not more than that. Congress can 
displace it with legislation.185 Indeed, Congress has recently done so with 
passage of the CLOUD Act as part of the March 23, 2018 omnibus spending 
bill.186 The CLOUD Act would replace the courts’ approach in Microsoft—
which turned on divining a situs for the “right of privacy”187—with a conflict 
of laws approach grounded in balancing the interests of multiple 
sovereigns.188 This is welcome change—though how the U.S. Supreme 
Court will respond is yet to be seen. 
However, this problem will persist in other areas, absent further 
Congressional action. Courts are in a difficult position. Courts may choose 
                                                                                                                     
181 Id. § 405 cmt. d. Nonetheless, the Restatement forcefully asserts a vision of this comity analysis 
that takes place wholesale—at the statutory interpretation level rather than the retail level—in each 
particular case. See id. § 405 cmt. a (“Reasonableness is a principle of statutory interpretation and not a 
discretionary judicial authority to decline to apply federal law. It operates in conjunction with other 
principles of statutory interpretation. When the intent of Congress to apply a particular provision is clear, 
a U.S. court must apply that provision even if doing so would interfere with the sovereign authority of 
other states.”). 
182 See Simowitz, supra note 155, at 259 (“Debts, shares of stock, intellectual property, wire 
transfers, LLC interests, and all other intangible assets have no physical location.”). 
183 Id. at 292. 
184 Id. (“Once the situs fiction is discarded, the problem of where an enforcing court can exert power 
over an intangible asset can be viewed anew through the lens of conflict of laws principles.”). 
185 Id. at 261 (“Congress introduced the concept of intangible situs into the law of tax as a deliberate 
legal fiction to address a particular problem.”). 
186 Woods & Swire, supra note 135. 
187 See supra notes 120–133 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s holding in Microsoft 
focusing on the “invasion of privacy” and locating the invasion in Ireland). 
188 See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text (explaining that the CLOUD Act mooted 
Microsoft and describing the Act’s balancing test). 
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a “regulatory focus” that is intangible and not subject to easy localization, 
such as the “right to privacy.” But this carries risks. The entire question of 
whether U.S. law will apply—often a question that will determine the 
outcome—will depend on seemingly arbitrary or irrelevant facts. For 
example, in Microsoft, it was far from clear why Microsoft’s decision on 
where to locate its servers should control whether U.S. law applies. It is not 
even clear that the location of the servers had any necessary connection to 
the location of the user’s “right to privacy.” After all, they are Microsoft’s 
servers and it is not Microsoft’s “right to privacy” at issue. (Although 
Microsoft could face serious concerns if were caught in the vise of foreign 
compulsion.) Nor is at all clear why the larger question of which sovereign’s 
law should apply should turn on server location. Before passage of the 
CLOUD Act, the question of whether the relevant data would be disclosed 
under U.S. law—and likely disclosed at all—turned on just these sorts of 
arbitrary and irrelevant factors.189 
On the other hand, if courts choose a regulatory focus that is readily 
localizable, but readily moveable, the application of U.S. law may turn 
entirely on decisions by private parties. In other words, Microsoft could 
effectively opt out of U.S. discovery and data protection law by locating its 
servers in Ireland. The Madoff operation (or future fraudulent enterprises) 
could easily opt out of U.S. fraudulent conveyance law by forming a foreign 
feeder fund. As the U.S. Supreme Court itself observed in RJR Nabisco, 
racketeers could easily move their enterprise abroad (particularly under the 
“nerve center” test that some lower courts had imported from the diversity 
jurisdiction context).190 Counterparties to off-exchange securities 
transactions could easily opt out of U.S. securities law by moving their 
transactions abroad. 
This danger can arise when a court selects a concrete, localizable focus 
or even when a court selects a diffuse, intangible regulatory focus.191 As the 
Microsoft case illustrates, a diffuse focus (the right to privacy) can quickly 
become yoked to a tangible and moveable on-the-ground object (the Dublin 
                                                                                                                     
189 See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 326 (2015) ( “[D]ata 
undermines longstanding assumptions about the link between data location and the rights and obligations 
that should apply.”). Daskal argues that server location has no “normative significance” to a user of 
electronic communications. This may be true to the average natural person—probably including the John 
Doe at issue in the Microsoft case. But it matters very much to the third-party e-mail providers—like 
Microsoft—that choose where to locate their server facilities. Whether that should matter in the analysis 
is a different question. 
190 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2104 (2016). 
191 The current draft Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law attempts to deal with some of 
this confusion by identifying a category of “non-geographic” focuses. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 404 Reporters’ Note 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“If a court 
concludes that the focus of a provision is non-geographic, then it would apply equally in foreign and 
domestic cases and no clear indication of extraterritoriality would be required.”). 
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servers).192 It may not always be obvious when the choice of a concrete focus 
or a concrete situs for an intangible focus will raise this concern. For 
example, corporate nationality is easily manipulable in many contexts.193 
Under the rule adopted by the Madoff district court,194 a U.S. transaction 
could be transformed into a Cayman Islands transaction merely by 
incorporating a Cayman special purpose entity as an intermediary. For the 
average hedge fund, that is practically costless. The Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) encountered this exact problem in attempting 
to promulgate regulations governing extraterritorial regulation of swap 
transaction.195 The CFTC settled on a rule requiring the registration under 
Dodd-Frank if the swap was guaranteed by a U.S. party (recognizing that 
limited the statute’s reach to U.S. counterparties would fail to adequately 
protect U.S. economic interests).196 The CFTC quickly found that the same 
swaps suddenly had foreign guarantors—in turn guaranteed by U.S. 
entities.197 
IV. A NEW FOCUS 
Morrison could have been interpreted very differently. The sources cited 
in Justice Scalia’s majority suggest that commentators and perhaps the Court 
itself were trying to craft a predictable, simple rule for exchange traded 
securities cases—and perhaps not more than that.198 Viewed in that light, 
Morrison is not especially troubling. It could have been viewed as a 
specification of the broader “reasonableness” principles in this one area. It 
may not be possible to frame a more precise than “reasonableness” for all 
                                                                                                                     
192 See Matter of Warrant Search Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 220 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated as moot sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 
S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2018) (per curiam) (holding that the invasion of privacy took place at the Microsoft 
servers in Dublin).  
193 William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2019) (“[R]ecent U.S. 
Supreme Court cases restricting the geographic scope of federal statutes create a space for commercial 
actors to circumvent regulation by incorporating in offshore jurisdictions.”). 
194 Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 513 B.R. 222, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
195 See William Morici, SIFMA v. CFTC: Derivative Swap Regulations Gain Extraterritorial 
Traction, CORNELL INT’L. L. REV. ONLINE (Nov. 20, 2014), http://cornellilj.org/sifma-v-cftc-derivative-
swap-regulations-gain-extraterritorial-traction/; John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial 
Regulation: Why E.T. Can't Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1274 (2014) (“Because OTC 
derivatives are not traded on exchanges, they do not have any clear-cut geographic location. Swap 
transactions can be between participants in two different countries, booked in a third country, and risk-
managed in a fourth country.”). 
196 Morici, supra note 195. 
197 See Coffee, supra note 195, at 1274 (“[S]wap transactions do not need to be based in the United 
States and could easily be moved offshore—if such a migration would allow the swap dealer to escape 
regulation. Thus, the incentive to engage in regulatory arbitrage is uniquely high, and an angry Congress 
decided in the Dodd-Frank Act to respond by deeming U.S. law to apply if a U.S. entity was involved.”).  
198 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austrl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 260 (2010) (“Commentators have criticized 
the unpredictable and inconsistent application of § 10(b) to transnational cases.” (citations omitted)).  
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cases of extraterritoriality—but surely the test could be more precisely 
defined in a particular area of law. 
But that is not what happened. The lower courts expressed reluctance to 
apply Morrison to other statutes.199 The U.S. Supreme Court did not. 
Kiobel200 and RJR Nabisco201 seemed to lay down the principle that the 
Morrison test would apply to all statutes—though the Court may yet retreat 
from that position.202 And so Morrison, steps one and two, are here to stay. 
A more rational, sensible, and yes, predictable, approach is required. Future 
courts can help to ameliorate some of the uncertainties inherent in the “focus 
test” by hewing to a few principles.  
A. Apply prescriptive comity 
Courts should recognize that the so-called “focus test” is a 
fundamentally transnational inquiry. It makes little sense to identify “the 
objects of the statute’s solicitude” without considering the context of the 
question. Indeed, the sources relied on by the Morrison Court suggest as 
much.203 A transnational approach to the focus test strongly suggest that 
courts should look to the principles of prescriptive comity to guide the 
inquiry. 
The new Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law moves the 
principle of “prescriptive comity” to the center of statutory interpretation 
and extraterritorial application. The Restatement describes the “principle of 
‘prescriptive comity’” as “a principle of statutory interpretation and not a 
discretionary judicial authority to decline to apply federal law.”204 
Prescriptive comity “does not seek to avoid all interference with the 
sovereign authority of other states, but rather to avoid unreasonable 
                                                                                                                     
199 See, e.g., United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In addition, although 
we find the available evidence here sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
there is reason to doubt that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to § 2423(b) at all.”). 
200 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013) (applying the Morrison test to 
the Alien Tort Statute). 
201 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016) (applying the Morrison test 
to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). 
202 In its most recent decision applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court 
declined to consider whether the presumption applied to remedial provisions, instead turning first to the 
focus test. See WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129 at 2136. 
203 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 260 (2010) (“Commentators have criticized the unpredictable and 
inconsistent application of § 10(b) to transnational cases.” (citing Choi & Silberman, Transnational 
Litigation and Global Securities Class–Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467–468; Chang, 
Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of 
Extraterritorial Subject–Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORD. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 106–108, 115–116 (2004); 
Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized 
Securities Marketplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 244–248 (1992)). 
204 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 405 cmt. a. (AM. LAW 
INST. 2018). 
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interference with such authority.”205  
This principle is most clearly embodied in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran.206 In Empagran, the Court 
rejected the most plausible textual reading of the statute in favor of a 
construction that would be avoid potential conflict with a U.K. regulatory 
scheme.207 The Court stated that it “ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes 
to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other 
nations,” and that “[t]his rule of statutory construction cautions courts to 
assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of 
other nations when they write American laws.”208 The Court signaled the 
strength of the principle of prescriptive comity by acknowledging that 
“considerations” of “comity and history” actually motivated it to reject the 
statutory reading that “might” be “the more natural reading.”209 The Court 
observed that, “[i]f the statute’s language reasonably permits an 
interpretation” that avoids unreasonable interference with another 
sovereign’s laws, “we should adopt it.”210 
Strangely, U.S. courts have almost entirely neglected to invoke this 
principle when faced with the question of determining the statute’s focus. 
Even the Restatement—which uses “prescriptive comity” as the organizing 
principle for the extraterritorial application of U.S. law—declines to mention 
the principle in reference to Morrison’s second step. The Restatement 
acknowledges that the “Supreme Court has adopted a two-step framework 
for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to federal statutory 
provisions and causes of action,” and lays out in some detail the parameters 
for application of this second step.211 The Restatement observes that 
“[d]ifferent federal statutory provisions focus on different things”212—some 
on “the proscribed conduct,”213 some on “transactions,”214 and some on 
                                                                                                                     
205 Id. (“Interference with the sovereign authority of foreign states may be reasonable if such 
application would serve the legitimate interests of the United States.”). 
206 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
207 Id. at 174. 
208 Id. at 164–65 (“It thereby helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together 
in harmony—a harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world.”). 
209 Id. at 174 (“At most, respondents’ linguistic arguments might show that respondents’ reading is 
the more natural reading of the statutory language. But those arguments do not show that we must accept 
that reading. And that is the critical point.”). 
210 Id. (“And, for the reasons stated, we believe that the statute’s language permits the reading that 
we give it.”). 
211 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 404, Reporters’ Note 
6 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (citing RJR and Morrison). 
212 Id. at n.8. 
213 Id. (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007); Pasquantino v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005)). 
214 Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010); EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949)). 
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“injury.”215 
As for the method for determining the statutory focus, the Restatement 
observes that the “focus of a provision may be indicated by its text,” or that 
“focus of the statute as a whole may also be relevant in determining the focus 
of its individual provisions,” or that the “focus of a statutory provision may 
also ‘be inferred from the nature of the offense.’”216 The Restatement also 
acknowledges that “[s]ometimes, the focus of a federal statutory provision 
is non-geographic”217 and that “[i]f a court concludes that the focus of a 
provision is non-geographic, then it would apply equally in foreign and 
domestic cases and no clear indication of extraterritoriality would be 
required.”218 
The Restatement’s approach is thus ecumenical and descriptive. It lists 
all the various approaches that the Supreme Court and (to a lesser extent) 
lower courts have taken in determining the “focus” of a statute.219 But it 
suggests no tool or recommended approaches for making that inquiry—or 
for choosing among multiple plausible focuses.220 Perhaps the proliferation 
of approaches makes any such articulation chancy at best. 
But it is striking that “prescriptive comity” is completely absent as an 
interpretative principle or tool.221 After all, the second step of Morrison does 
the exact same practical work as the first step—determining whether a U.S. 
statute will apply to a particular claim or constellation of facts. One may 
argue that step-one resolves these questions wholesale, whereas step-two is 
more retail. But this both overstates the simplicity of step-one and 
understates the impact of step-two. 
The Restatement endorses the notion that a court may impose additional 
limitations of the reach of a U.S. statute even if the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been rebutted. The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign 
Relations Law states that the “application of the presumption does not 
preclude U.S. courts from interpreting a statute to include other comity 
limitations if doing so is consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the 
provision,”222 and that “U.S. courts have construed statutory provisions to 
include a variety of other comity limitations depending on the text, history, 
                                                                                                                     
215 Id. (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016); F. Hoffmann-
La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 
U.S. 764, 796 (1993); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286, 288 (1952)). 
216 Id. (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)). 
217 Id. at n.10 (citation omitted). 
218 Id.  
219 See supra notes 211–18 and accompanying text (highlighting sections of the Restatement that 
discuss Supreme Court approaches to determining a statute’s focus). 
220 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 404 (AM. LAW INST. 
2018). 
221 Id.  
222 Id. § 405 cmt. c.  
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and purpose of the particular provision.”223 Similarly, the resolution of step-
two is not a case-by-case inquiry—rather, it resolves whether an entire class 
of claims will be included under the statute’s reach. 
Some courts seem to articulate concerns based in prescriptive comity, 
although not under that name. In his Madoff opinion, Judge Rakoff 
proclaimed that he was engaging in a “straightforward reading” that yielded 
a regulatory focus on the ultimate transfer, rather than on the estate.224 At the 
outset, Judge Rakoff rejected that Trustee’s argument that the regulatory 
focus was on the estate because, on “the level of policy, this approach could 
raise serious issues of international comity.”225 However, Judge Rakoff did 
not treat comity as a principle of statutory interpretation226—as the 
Restatement and Empagram suggest—but as a free-standing “choice-of-law 
analysis to determine whether the application of U.S. law would be 
reasonable under the circumstances, comparing the interests of the United 
States and the relevant foreign state,” that would apply “even if the 
presumption against extraterritoriality were rebutted.”227 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned 
the district court on this point as well, but introduced yet another variation 
of the comity analysis. In the appellate court’s account, the choice of the 
statutory focus drove the subsequent comity analysis. The court was careful 
to note that it was engaging in a prescriptive, rather than adjudicative, comity 
analysis, but following a prior panel’s decision in In re Maxwell, seemed to 
treat the comity analysis as additional separate step to be added at the very 
end of the analysis. However, the choice of the initial transfer as the focus, 
rather than the ultimate transfer drove the comity analysis: “The lower 
courts, erroneously focusing on the subsequent transfer, found that the 
jurisdictions adjudicating the feeder funds’ liquidations had a greater interest 
in resolving these disputes than the United States. . . . This conclusion rests 
on incorrect premises.” The appellate court concluded that, because the 
“focus is on regulating and remedying a debtor’s fraudulent transfer of 
property . . . [t]he domestic nature of those transfers, and our nation’s 
compelling interest in regulating them, tips the scales of In re Maxwell’s 
choice-of-law test in favor of domestic adjudication.”228 
                                                                                                                     
223 Id. § 204 cmt. d. 
224 Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 513 B.R. 222, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
225 Id. 
226 Judge Rakoff’s elision of the two doctrines placed the Trustee in a Catch-22. Sec. Inv’r Prot. 
Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. AP 08-01789 (SMB), Adv. No. 11-02760 (SMB), 2016 
WL 6900689, at *9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016).  
227 Madoff, 513 B.R. 222, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
228 In re Picard, Tr. for Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 917 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2019) 
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B. Recognize multiple focuses 
In its amicus brief in RJR Nabisco v. European Community, the United 
States government argued that the RICO statute focused on multiple things: 
racketeering enterprises, patterns of racketeering conduct, and the injuries of 
those harmed by racketeering activity.229 In a vacuum, this assertion seems 
uncontroversial—practically obvious. Of course Congress had been 
concerned with stamping out racketeering enterprise, deterring racketeering 
conduct, and redressing the harms suffered by victims of that conduct. 
And yet, multiple circuit courts had been “deeply divided”230 by the 
question of which of these “objects of the statute’s solicitude” was the sole 
focus on the RICO statute. The origins of this resistance are not clear—but 
the most likely explanation is that lower courts have been extremely wary of 
any holdings that would appear to recapitulate the “conduct and effects” test 
derided in Morrison. However, this unconditional resistance has distorted 
the application of these statutes and does not necessarily reflect the thrust of 
the Morrison opinion. 
Justice Scalia derided the Second Circuit’s long-standing approach to 
the extraterritorial application of § 10(b). In his telling, the Second Circuit 
ignored the presumption against extraterritoriality, a principle “long and 
often recited in our opinions,” because the lower court “believed that, 
because the Exchange Act is silent as to the extraterritorial application of § 
10(b), it was left to the court to ‘discern’ whether Congress would have 
wanted the statute to apply.”231 He stated that this approach has “produced a 
collection of tests for divining what Congress would have wanted, complex 
in formulation and unpredictable in application.”232 He argued that the 
Second Circuit “had excised the presumption against extraterritoriality from 
the jurisprudence of § 10(b) and replaced it with the inquiry whether it would 
be reasonable (and hence what Congress would have wanted) to apply the 
statute to a given situation.”233 The conduct and effects test “became the 
north star of the Second Circuit’s § 10(b) jurisprudence, pointing the way to 
                                                                                                                     
229 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (No. 15-138), 2015 WL 9268185, at *9 (“Contrary to 
petitioners’ claim, RICO contains no domestic-enterprise requirement. RICO’s ‘focus’ (Morrison, 561 
U.S. at 266) is on the ‘pattern’ as well as the enterprise. Accordingly, if a pattern of domestic racketeering 
activity occurs, RICO may be violated whether the enterprise is foreign or domestic.”). 
230 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., (2016) (No. 15-138), 
2015 WL 4572754, at *11 (“Prior to the panel decision below, the courts had unanimously concluded at 
step one of Morrison that RICO ‘does not apply extraterritorially.’ At step two, however, the courts 
sharply divided over how to distinguish between domestic and extraterritorial applications.” (citation 
omitted)). 
231 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255. 
232 Id. at 255–56. 
233 Id. at 257. 
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what Congress would have wished.”234 Justice Scalia observed that the 
“Second Circuit never put forward a textual or even extratextual basis for 
these tests.”235  
Justice Scalia devoted a paragraph each to his critiques that the the 
conduct and effects test was difficult administer and non-uniform. He then 
returned to his principal theme—quoting Judge Bork—“that rather than 
courts’ divining what Congress would have wished if it had addressed the 
problem,” a “more natural inquiry might be what jurisdiction Congress in 
fact thought about and conferred.”236 In turning to commentary, Justice 
Scalia noted the perceived violence that the conduct and effects test did to 
proper textual interpretation.237 
 To the extent that Justice Scalia did focus on administration of the 
test—rather than its extra-textual origins—his comments do not suggest an 
absolute aversion to focusing on conduct and effects, as such. Rather, the 
test as applied by the lower courts improperly “resolv[ed] matter of 
policy.”238  
C. Vindicate statutory purpose 
The Court examined only in dicta RJR Nabisco’s argument that the 
racketeering “enterprise” was the focus of RICO.239 The Court noted that an 
“enterprise” is difficult to locate and that if more definite tests are used to do 
                                                                                                                     
234 Id. at 257–58. 
235 See id. at 258 (noting language from the appellate court that “if we were asked to point to 
language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we would 
be unable to respond” (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
236 See id. at 260 (noting that Judge Bork had deferred to the Second Circuit approach in light of its 
“preeminence” in the field of securities law (Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co. 824 F.2d, 27, 32 (1987))). 
237 See id. (“Some have challenged the premise underlying the Courts of Appeals’ approach, namely 
that Congress did not consider the extraterritorial application of § 10(b) (thereby leaving it open to the 
courts, supposedly, to determine what Congress would have wanted.”) (citing Margaret V. Sachs, The 
International Reach of Rule 10b–5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
677 (1990)); id. at 260–61 (“Others, more fundamentally, have noted that using congressional silence as 
a justification for judge-made rules violates the traditional principle that silence means no extraterritorial 
application.” (citing John D. Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New U.S. 
Jurisprudence with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti–Fraud Provisions of the 1933 
and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT'L BUS. 477, 492–93 (1997)). 
238 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 259 (“While applying the same fundamental methodology of balancing 
interests and arriving at what seemed the best policy, they produced a proliferation of vaguely related 
variations on the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ tests.”). The sources relied on by the Court also give greater 
context to the Court’s concern. Professors Silberman and Choi’s work was prominently cited in the 
Morrison majority. See, e.g., Choi & Silberman, supra note 150 (arguing only that the exchange was the 
appropriate point of regulatory concern for publicly traded equities and refusing to argue against a 
wholesale rejection of the conducts-and-effects test, even though its issues were recognized). 
239 See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2104 (2016). (“It is easy to see why 
Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enterprises. A domestic enterprise requirement would lead to 
difficult line-drawing problems and counterintuitive results . . . . RJR also offers no satisfactory way of 
determining whether an enterprise is foreign or domestic.”). 
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so, it will render racketeering enterprises easy to relocate.240 Therefore, the 
choice of the enterprise as the “regulatory focus” of RICO would undermine 
the very purposes of the statute itself: “It would exclude from RICO’s reach 
foreign enterprises—whether corporations, crime rings, other associations, 
or individuals—that operate within the United States.”241 Or in the words of 
the United States of Appeals for the Second Circuit: “Surely the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of United States laws does not command 
giving foreigners carte blanche to violate the laws of the United States in the 
United States.”242 
Much of the criticism of the lower court opinions in the Madoff and 
Microsoft disputes followed this theme: If selection of a certain regulatory 
focus would permit easy evasion of the regulatory law itself—it should be 
rejected. Parties should not be able to evade the United States’s regulatory 
apparatus simply by engaging in data localization abroad and by 
incorporating a foreign feeder fund. In other words, Morrison analysis 
should be conduct with a simple anti-evasion principle in mind. The choice 
required of Morrison step-two—the statute’s “regulatory focus”—should 
not undermine the regulatory scheme itself. A court’s selection of a “focus” 
will dramatically affect how the statute functions in transnational disputes. 
The court should therefore select a focus that vindicates, rather than 
undermines or defeats, the functioning of the regulatory scheme. 
The United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded its 
analysis in the Madoff case by invoking this anti-evasion, anti-loophole 
principle. The court noted that “[f]actoring the transferee’s receipt of 
property into our analysis would not only misread the Bankruptcy Code’s 
avoidance and recovery provisions, but also open a loophole.”243 The court 
noted that, if a “fraudster transferred the property to a foreign entity that then 
transferred it to another foreign entity,” and the Bankruptcy Code could not 
reach subsequent foreign transfers, “that transfer would make the property 
recovery-proof, even if the subsequent foreign transferee then sent the 
property to someone located in the United States.” The court closed its 
analysis with the observation: “We cannot imagine how [the Morrison 
presumption] should guide us to read the Bankruptcy Code’s creditor-
protection provisions in this self-defeating way.”244 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has developed a bit of a habit of reversing the courts on issues of 
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extraterritoriality.  Congress reversed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Aramco, amending to Title VII to apply to U.S. citizens applied by U.S. entities 
abroad.  Congress reversed the Court’s decision in Morrison, at least with regard 
to government actions, explicitly restoring the conduct-and-effects test. Most 
recently, Congress reversed the United State Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit’s decision in the Microsoft litigation, setting by legislation the rule the 
location of the data is irrelevant to the analysis of whether the date will be 
disclosed. 
The problem is not simply that the Morrison test is flawed. The problem is 
that, in some instances, any choice will be wrong. In the Microsoft litigation, the 
court was faced with a choice of everything or nothing. Either every bit of data 
accessible in the United States would be disclosable subject to U.S. law—or 
every bit of data localized abroad would be shielded from it. That sort of in-or-
out choice is in the very nature of the “focus test.” And that decision will not turn 
on the competing interests of sovereigns—but rather of seemingly arbitrary or 
irrelevant facts such as the location of computer terminals or servers. 
The Morrison test seems here to stay. But it can be improved with the 
excision of some of the formalisms that have accumulated since Morrison 
was decided. This article seeks both to scrape off those barnacles and to set 
a few guiding principles for a less troubled path forward. 
  
 
 
